

**From Crisis to Community:
What Elementary Principals Learned on 9/11**

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Annotation: This paper provides an overview of the purposes and motivation for crisis management planning in schools and recommendations to assist school personnel in reviewing and revising their crisis management plans in light of potential future crises. In addition, this paper summarizes the results of a recent national study focusing on crisis management planning in elementary schools. Specifically, this study examined the immediate and long-term responses of elementary school principals to the crisis of September 11, 2001.

Abstract: The purpose of this study was to investigate the responses of elementary principals to the terrorist events of September 11, 2001. The objectives of this study were to determine the degree to which elementary principals perceived their school's crisis management plan supported their leadership on 9/11 and in the days and weeks that followed, and the degree to which elementary principals perceived these actions were connected to building ongoing community in their schools.

National survey data were collected from 1000 randomly selected elementary principals. Telephone interviews were conducted with 30 volunteers from among the survey respondents. Interview questions elicited personal insights, reflections and anecdotal information that illuminated and expanded the survey data. The results of this study link crisis management planning to effective leadership. When coupled, these elements yield a safe school environment and development of a cohesive educational community.

Background on Crisis Management Plans in Schools

Crisis management planning for schools is a recent phenomenon. National Interest has grown continually over the past 15 years because of the obvious need for local security and preparedness in times of crisis (Buckner & Flanary, 1996). This should not be surprising since, as early as 1992, Pitcher and Poland observed that, "the school environment has changed quite substantially in the past few decades" (p. 3).

As early as 1987, a national survey reported that leading school psychologists believed crisis intervention was becoming an important issue about which more information should be gathered (Wise, Smead, & Huebner, 1987). In spite of this early interest, crisis intervention was still considered novel in the early 1990s (Pitcher & Poland, 1992). Traditionally schools have prepared for comparatively local crises such

as fire, floods, or blizzards. Modern social conditions, both at home and at school, are adding many more crises to this list including “AIDS, bomb threats, chemical spills, sniper attacks, violent intruders, and terrorism, to name a few” (Pitcher and Poland, 1992, p. 19).

School violence as well as the recent national terrorist threats have thrust crisis management planning into the limelight and prompted state and federal officials to become actively involved in prevention of and preparation for future crises. In March of 1998, two boys, ages 11 and 13, opened fire on their Jonesboro AR, middle school classmates leaving five students dead and 15 wounded (Labi, 1998). In May of the same year, a 15-year-old boy used a semiautomatic rifle and two pistols to kill two students and wound 18 others in Springfield OR (Hornblower, 1998). These were only the prelude to one of the most violent and deadly acts conducted on America’s school grounds-- Columbine. On April 20, 1999, two Columbine students rampaged their school leaving 15 students dead and 24 wounded (Gibbs, 1999).

Because of violent attacks such as these and terrorist threats on the national level, crisis preparedness has become an expected part of school safety initiatives and has prompted state and federal legislative action. By 1999, for example, both Alaska and Virginia adopted legislation that required their public schools to write school crisis response plans. In Virginia this meant amending the state code related to school safety to include emergency management and school crisis plans (Brock, Sandoval, & Lewis, 2001). Brock et al. report (2001):

Two federal legislative efforts may also be seen as developing an expectation for school crisis preparedness and response. First, the School Safety Enhancement Act of 1999 proposed the establishment of the National Center for School and Youth Safety. . . . Also, the School Anti-Violence Empowerment Act would

authorize the Secretary of Education to provide grants to school districts to help them establish or enhance crisis intervention programs. (p. 8)

A deluge of new books, articles and journals related to school safety is but another indicator of a growing interest in crisis management (Brock et al., 2001; Cornell, 1998; Decker, 1997; Matsakis, 1994; Obiakor, Mehring, & Schwenn, 1997; Pitcher & Poland, 1992; Slaikeu, 1990; Trump, 1998).

How has this recent ground swell of interest in crisis management shaped actions on the local school level? School responses fall into two categories that include first, measures which can be taken immediately and call for organizational and procedural changes. The second category calls for measures that are more complex and humane, affecting the long-term climate and atmosphere of the school.

In terms of immediate actions, when responding to a crisis, many schools sought to increase safety and security by assigning police officers to school buildings, installing metal detectors at entrances to prevent students from bringing weapons into the school, and enacting zero tolerance policies to guarantee the automatic removal of students who perpetrated acts of violence (Currie, 1994). Other immediate intervention procedures were designed to place schools back into a "normal" or "pre-crisis" state as quickly as possible (Brock et al., 2001; Obiakor et al., 1997; Pitcher & Poland, 1992). These included for example, the development of procedures for media releases, alterations to the schedule, and outlining clear lines of command response protocols.

Long-term measures to secure a safe school atmosphere included the development of conflict resolution programs, violence prevention education plans and staff development in a host of academic as well as psycho-social fields (Aguilera, 1998; Decker, 1997; Gutek, 2000).

While no sharp line can be drawn defining the boundary between an immediate action and a long-term action, how school leaders respond immediately following an incident can have a long-term and cumulative impact on the school's climate (Kline, Schonfeld, & Lichtenstein, 1995, p. 245). Pitcher and Poland (1992) satirically commented that "school districts that get caught with their 'plans down' may have a great deal of difficulty facing the community" (p. 6). Further, Decker (1997) observed:

When school personnel are prepared to deal with crisis, students can continue to grow emotionally, intellectually, and physically. . . . With proper preparation, a crisis can be used to unite students and staff in building confidence and cohesiveness among themselves and within the larger public community. It is possible for the school to bring students together, forming a sense of community that only comes from a deep sharing. A school does not realize this benefit by taking a "business as usual" approach to a crisis situation. . . . Because it is difficult to make all the decisions necessary to contain the crisis and channel the emotional on the day of an event, preplanning will be your greatest asset. (p. 6)

Learning about crisis management is also a cumulative process. Experience with crises creates a foundation for school leaders to build upon when planning for the unknowns of the future. Disasters vary in length of warning period, intensity of the catastrophe, duration of impact, number of people involved, extent of property damage, number of casualties, and requirements of the recovery period. (Franklin, 1983, p. 150).

How then should schools review and revise crisis management plans? Revision of a school crisis plan annually is vital to keeping documents and information current. Following 9/11, most schools added terrorism procedures to their existing plans if nothing was written on this topic previous to this date. All plans should include provisions for pre-planning, interventions/response and post-emergency activities. Specific recommendations to consider in revising crisis management plans include the following:

1. Have plans externally reviewed.
2. Conduct a risk and vulnerability assessment.
3. Develop a multidisciplinary planning team.
4. Be sure a chain of command is outlined in case a key administrator is unavailable.
5. Standardize a school district's plans; tailor the system plan with site-specific procedures.
6. Use functional protocols for major aspects of the emergency operation plan (i.e., sharing news of tragedy in individual classrooms by teacher versus using the public address system).
7. Have a designated spokesperson to the media.
8. Have a network of key communicators who deliver the same message from a pre-approved fact sheet.
9. Develop a specific response plan (way to document actions taken—could be a checklist).
10. Properly distribute materials and train staff.
11. Develop a photo-tour of your school with a hard copy photo of each facility of all critical areas, and key pieces of equipment and controls. (Dorn, M., 2004; Virginia Department of Education, 1996, 2002)

A plethora of books and websites exist that can provide assistance in examining crisis management plans. The reference section included with this article is a good starting place. Following are a few websites that provide samples of crisis management plans as well as templates to create or modify such plans: [Crisis Management Plan](#),

Allegan County Intermediate School District (1999), [Crisis Management Plan](#), Iowa
School Violence Crisis Intervention Task Force (1999), [Emergency Management Guide
Template](#), Kentucky Center for School Safety (2001), [Model School Crisis Management
Plan](#), Virginia Department of Education (1996, 2002), [Crisis Management Plan](#),
Waukegan Community Unit School District (2003).

How does recent research inform the decisions of school leaders when crisis situations occur? Crisis management has increasingly caught the attention of educational researchers and professionals. Blom (1986), a medical doctor, reviewed a study that examined a broad school-based assessment and intervention program in an article called “A School Disaster—Intervention and Research Aspects.” This study was implemented shortly after a crane struck a 231-foot-long pedestrian overpass connected to an elementary school in Lansing, MI, on September 16, 1977. About 20 children were on the overpass at the time of this accident and over 100 children witnessed the event from the adjoining school playground. Six boys fell 15 feet to the pavement and were rushed to a nearby hospital. Five of these children were seriously injured and hospitalized. They all were back in school three months later. This study sought to assess whether the collaboration from different agencies for this ad hoc intervention plan were successful in “assisting a large population, assimilate an unpredictable catastrophic event and adapt again to a predictable world” (p. 336). This is one of the first times that an intervention plan was utilized in a school system with follow-up research to document its effectiveness.

Foley (1986) highly recommended the need for staff involvement in making decisions about how schools operate because “once they are conditioned to feel safe in

offering suggestions, they will be prepared to respond to calls for help in crisis” (p. 51).

Foley shared his anecdotal responses as an administrator to two crisis situations. The first involved a police shooting of a recent dropout at Foley’s school after the student took two former classmates hostage. The second situation was the death of Christa McAuliffe, the teacher-astronaut who died in the explosion of the Space Shuttle Challenger. McAuliffe was a teacher at Foley’s school in Concord, NH, when she was chosen for NASA’s Teacher in Space Program.

Another high school principal, Mathers (1996), spoke about the terrorist attack on the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995. Workers and children were already present in the building when a timed bomb exploded at 9:02 a.m. during the usual busy morning routines. A total of 168 people died in the explosion with over 700 injured (Mallonee, Shariat, Stennies, Waxweiler, Hogan, & Jordan, 1996). Mathers documented the step-by-step procedures his administrative team used to implement their site crisis management plan. Some students were directly affected because they lost loved ones in this tragic event. The enacted crisis management plan was utilized to help these families. Mathers (1996) reflected on this incident: “The bombing had changed the lives of Oklahomans as no other event in our state’s history. We all felt a deep sense of anxiety about the future; we all felt robbed of our personal sense of security and control; we had forever lost our innocence” (pp. 42-43).

A study by Pfefferbaum, Seale, McDonald, Brandt, Rainwater, Maynard, Meierhoefer, & Miller (2000) addressed the posttraumatic stress of 69 sixth graders who lived over 100 miles from Oklahoma City two years after the city’s bombing. Children chosen for the study neither had any direct physical exposure nor personally knew

anyone killed or injured in the explosion. The findings suggested that children geographically distant from disaster who have not directly experienced interpersonal loss still can have posttraumatic stress syndrome symptoms and some functional impairment because of heightened awareness from media exposure and indirect loss.

Roberta Gaston, director of guidance and counseling in the 40,000 student Oklahoma City school district, said that even six years after the terrorist's bomb exploded in a downtown federal building "some wounds run deep. We are still talking to children to see what they need in terms of additional counseling, and our tragedy was terrible, terrible beyond imagination" (as cited in Bowman, 2001, p. 19).

Six months following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, over 8,000 children at 94 schools in New York City participated in a study conducted by mental health researchers regarding the impact of the terrorist events on them. "Nine out of 10 New York City school children suffered at least one symptom of post-traumatic stress . . . and almost 10% likely had the disorder." The children, who were located throughout the city not just near ground zero, showed "symptoms of several psychiatric problems." Some of the children admitted "they had trouble sleeping. Others said they feared leaving the house. Most found their minds wandering back to images of burning towers and the horror" ("N.Y.C. Children Suffer," 2002, p. A8).

Trump (2000) predicted that even more possible damage to children could result if schools became direct targets of terrorists' acts.

Attention to international and domestic terrorism in the late 1990s should lead us to question how vulnerable our schools might be to terrorist attacks and threats. There is no question that Americans overall are sensitive to the impact of violence and that the acts of terrorists shock even the most veteran public safety officials. The shock value of terrorist threats and acts is multiplied when children are involved.

What would you do if your school received an Anthrax scare? What if a gunman upset with the government enters your school and takes several staff and students hostage? Or, what if a school is bombed by international terrorists as their means of sending a message to U.S. leaders? Although these questions raise horrible thoughts, the reality of such incidents occurring would be even more horrible. To avoid thinking about preventing and managing such terrorist attacks, however, would be most horrible, if not negligent. School officials must realize that violence is not pretty and that they need to prepare for the worst-case scenario, even though it might never occur.

Still, although we hope that it will never occur, the sad reality is that this may be one of the next waves of violence to hit our schools. (pp. 40-41)

The current study was built upon prior research in the area of crisis planning and specifically focuses on the response of elementary school principals to the events of September 11, 2001.

Introduction to the Current Study

“I think 9/11 brought our school together as a community more so with a common interest in our country and an interest in what it means to be an American,” words of an elementary principal from Michigan (McCarty, 2002, p. 262).

September 11, 2001, will be forever etched in America’s collective memory. Citizens everywhere woke up to find the United States was no longer immune to terrorism as if it only happens “somewhere else.” The carnage witnessed in New York City and Washington, DC, replayed over and over on our televisions and in our minds may be the defining event for this generation. Young people attending America’s schools witnessed history in the making that day just as their grandparents or great-grandparents experienced the “day of infamy.” As Pearl Harbor shaped the generation of World War II, September 11, 2001, will leave an “indelible mark on psyches of today’s children and adolescents, regardless of their proximity to New York City or Washington” (Bowman, 2001, p. 19).

As educational leaders, elementary principals respond to “routine” crises on a daily basis. However, 9/11 was as overwhelming to them as their teachers and students. Most were flooded by questions such as: How should I respond? What shall I tell staff, students and families? and How do I minimize the impact these events will have on students? How principals answered these questions was a measure of the quality of their response that day.

To construct a picture of how elementary principals’ responded to 9/11, we conducted a national survey of two hundred sixty elementary principals and interviewed an additional thirty. The survey results profile the decisions principals made that day and shed light on how they see their role in crisis situations. So what did elementary principals learn on 9/11?

Maintain Normalcy in the Face of Crisis

Principals indicated that maintaining normalcy was of primary importance and their highest priority. Returning to a state of normalcy is a universal goal of crisis management (Brock, Sandoval, & Lewis, 2001). Principals suggested that “keeping school as normal as possible” was the order of the day because a stable atmosphere would provide the best psychological environment for the children and teachers. One principal said, “I just told the teachers to try to make things as normal as possible for the kids so they have this [school] as an anchor” (McCarty, 2002, p. 311). Another principal echoed this same thought, “We were keeping school as normal as possible for children because we thought that was what was best for kids. . . . We wanted school to be as stable and as caring as possible” (McCarty, 2002, p. 247). Still another principal believed that “if you start changing routines it sends a different kind of message [to kids]” (McCarty, 2002, p. 333).

Follow Your Crisis Management Plan

Principals found that the Crisis Management Plan was an important asset in the face of the uncertain events of 9/11. Ninety-seven percent of principals reported that their district had developed a crisis management plan prior to 9/11 and many reported the plan was very useful on that day. One principal said, “It really drove home why those plans need to be in place and everybody needs to understand what we do so that it isn’t chaos” (McCarty, 2002, p. 256). Still another principal said:

I don’t know that there’s anything that really prepares you for this, but you at least have some outlines to follow. You have criteria that you know is in place. It helps you focus and apply your knowledge and then deal with it appropriately. You don’t get so caught up in the moment that you forget what you’re supposed to be doing. (McCarty, 2002, p. 342)

Plan to Improvise

Principals found that despite the best laid plans, they often needed to improvise when confronting crisis. Despite the best crisis management plans, principals found they had no prescribed “curriculum” to draw upon when facing the challenges of 9/11. Improvisation and in many cases creativity were the order of the day. On the west coast, where students came to school as the day’s events were unfolding, one elementary principal spent that day walking from room to room assuring children of their safety and talking to them in language they would understand. In another school, the staff created an alternative to recess by offering the choice room, a place where children could express their fears and anxieties through a variety of artistic activities. Another principal, on the east coast, asked teachers to ride the school buses at the close of the day to help students feel calm and safe. Another principal “controlled the media” (Robinson & Henning, 2002, p. 4) by not allowing young students to view the events over and over again on televisions. In the absence of specific procedures outlined in a crisis management plan many principals found it necessary to improvise.

Update Your Crisis Management Plan Regularly

Principals learned first-hand that the crisis management plan needed to be updated on a regular basis. While the vast majority of principals reported having a crisis management plan, few plans outlined specific procedures to follow in the event of a crisis of the magnitude of 9/11. One principal did describe how the central office sent out immediate directives activating the district crisis management plan including specifics regarding statements to be made to the children, the use or non-use of television, telephone protocols, and use of community support personnel. But this level of centralized direction was not the norm. As one principal said, "In our crisis plan, nothing like this was really addressed" (McCarty, 2002, p. 290).

As a result, many elementary principals found 9/11 to present them with many unanswered questions ranging from management of public information to dispensing student medication. For example, How much information do we give children? In what form do we give this information? What lines of communication are set up with the community? Do we expose children to the media and television coverage? Do we maintain a normal schedule for the day? Do we dismiss school or keep students in the building? In the event of evacuation, what procedures do we follow for student medications?

Kenneth Trump, a leading advisor on school safety, recommends, "School safety and crisis preparedness planning should be regarded as an ongoing process, not a single event. Safety plans and crisis guidelines must be revisited at least annually and tweaked if necessary to meet new challenges" (2002, p. 10). The principals we interviewed echoed this recommendation, especially the necessity to process problems following new

challenges such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks. As one principal commented, “9/11 certainly confirms the need to get together and go through your protocols. . . . We are now getting together periodically and taking about how things are going and how we handle situations” (McCarty, 2002, p. 237).

Build Updated Plans on Past Experience

Principals found that previous experiences responding to crises, especially the relatively recent Columbine shootings, informed how crisis management plans were updated and refined. In the area of crisis management, knowledge is cumulative. A principal from Connecticut commented that after Columbine she attended a crisis training session that helped her maintain “the presence of mind. . . . to be sure the same message goes out to everyone” (McCarty, 2002, p. 258). Another principal said, “We have a good plan. We’ve worked on it for a lot of years. We added a crisis management team like everybody else did after Columbine. We’ve rehearsed it, and we planned it. Our teams are trained” (McCarty, 2002, p. 316). Following 9/11 many principals indicated that crisis management plans for some schools now include floor plans of the school for authorities, highly visible names on all exterior exit doors to direct authorities to specific building locations, and a telephone script so that all callers receive consistent and accurate information.

Communicate Accurately and Proactively

Principals learned the value of releasing accurate and timely information. Some principals were overwhelmed by the quick decision-making 9/11 demanded of them. Others were simply numbed into silence. In one school, the principal decided to cancel recess. When students inquired as to why recess was cancelled, the principal told them

that it was National Inside Recess Day and communities all around were participating. A principal in another district reported that when students asked why recess was cancelled, she told them the school was trying out a new schedule. These principals later regretted passing along misinformation and would have proceeded differently had they been able to replay their decisions that day.

In another school outside recess was cancelled but children were given no justification. The principal of this school stated that the teachers wished that something had been said to the children about why recess was called off because “. . . the students started making up stuff. What they made up was not accurate” (McCarty, 2002, p. 312). Consequently, the principal was forced into a reactive rather than proactive position as she dispensed information about the events of 9/11.

Another principal reflected on the importance of effective communication by saying, “I regret it now. . . . I should have called my staff together and done some type of debriefing, but that was not something that I thought of [on that day]” (McCarty, 2002, p. 269).

Use Crisis to Build Ongoing Community

Principals learned that if they channeled renewed enthusiasm for citizenship into a planned and intentional approach for teaching citizenship, they were more likely to see lasting results after the shock of the crisis dissipated. One principal observed, “Sometimes it takes a crisis or a tragedy to pull people together” (McCarty, 2002, p. 309). However this positive sentiment is difficult to sustain if not nurtured. Elias (2001) says:

History tells us that the positive messages of tragedy do not last very long. While hundreds of thousands of people were directly affected by the terrorist acts, many

millions were not. They will seek refuge and comfort in a return to their routines, as well they should. But we dare not let this moment pass without drawing an important lesson: We must educate our students for civic participation, for the development of sound character, and to understand clearly the gifts of our democratic freedom. (p. 40)

In the face of the 9/11 crisis many schools pulled together to ensure the immediate safety and security of children. This “circling of the wagons” around a common concern often created an immediate sense of unity. However, without capitalizing on this windfall of community through intentional citizenship-building activities, in many schools the renewed sense of community dissipated almost as quickly as it appeared. A principal from the southwest reported:

There was a high level of tolerance at the beginning [after 9/11]. . . . It’s the end of the year now, and I just want to say—Did you forget all that we just learned six months ago? They’ve gone back to a lot of intolerance. (McCarty, 2002, p. 275)

In many cases crisis was the impetus for development of citizenship and character education programs. One principal noted, “It’s sort of ironic that after 9/11 the whole character education piece really seemed to be more important to everybody” (McCarty, 2002, p. 380). Another principal stated that one result of the 9/11 crisis was the development of a program emphasizing school pride and character development. “. . . we’ve started a character education theme that we’re doing. October was patriotic; November was giving and December was a rainbow of compassion” (McCarty, 2002, p. 268). Another principal described Skills for Success, a program designed to promote values such as citizenship, tolerance, patience, responsibility, and respect.

Conclusion: The Worst of Times and the Best of Times

The worst of times: On 9/11, a “community” of 19 men working in coordinated fashion took the world hostage through shockingly violent acts designed to create fear in

the hearts of people everywhere. The terrorists' tactics were based on the premise that a very localized event can produce results that reverberate internationally. The terrorists who attacked the Twin Towers and the Pentagon demonstrated they could capture national and international attention far beyond what their limited numbers and resources would suggest (Livingstone, 1982).

The best of times: The same mechanism works to the advantage of principals who labor for excellence, who work to shape their schools into safe harbors of community for the children in their charge. Over ten years ago Marva Collins (1992) observed:

It has always been citizens with the determination of a lit firecracker that have made the worst of times the best of times. . . . What has always made the fetid times in society better times were citizens who did not sit back with a 'so-what-it's-not-my-problem-attitude.' It was those determined citizens that picked away at the roots of evil. (p. 65)

With the same spirit and determination, the highly localized actions of principals—who perform daily routines that are anything but “routine”, who inspire the future of children, who encourage under appreciated teachers, who carry with them portfolios of daily burdens, challenges and even accomplishments—are sure to produce the results in the lives of children that will reverberate from the classrooms and hallways of their buildings into the city, the state, the nation and the world.

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